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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR
SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES:
HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS
AND NUDGES
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Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the difference between two types of
behavioural policies – nudges and boosts. We distinguish them on the basis
of the mechanisms through which they are expected to operate and identify
the contextual conditions that are necessary for each policy to be successful.
Our framework helps judging which type of policy is more likely to bring
about the intended behavioural outcome in a given situation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Behavioural policy – the application of insights from behavioural
research to public policy – has found widespread acceptance in recent
years (e.g. Oliver 2013; Shafir 2013; Bhargava and Loewenstein 2015;
Chetty 2015). Many governmental and non-governmental organizations
currently advise or decree the use of behavioural insights when designing
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interventions to achieve specific policy goals.1 Proponents of behavioural
policies often adopt a pragmatic perspective that stresses the dependence
of both the success and the ethical acceptability of different behavioural
interventions on the policy context (e.g. Chetty 2015; Soll et al. 2015;
Sunstein 2016). In other words, motivated by concerns about extrapolation
and external validity, they claim that the choice of a policy tool should
ultimately depend on considerations specific to the context of intended
application (for earlier philosophical arguments of context-dependence
see Steel 2008; Cartwright and Hardie 2012). This recognition has so far
not led to an approach that systematically includes context-dependence in
planning, testing and implementing policies, however. Given that testing
a behavioural policy, for example in a field experiment, often already
amounts to its partial implementation, it is recommendable to make
optimal use of both theoretical and empirical resources before deciding
how to intervene in a specific context.
Within the domain of non-incentivizing, non-coercive policies, in
this paper we focus on two types of behavioural interventions: nudges
and boosts (Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2016; Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff
2017). As a first approximation, nudges steer people towards a particular
behaviour by creating environmental conditions that trigger a given
heuristic strategy. In contrast, boosts change behaviour by fostering
people’s decision-making competences in a given environment. Our
analysis has two goals. First, it aims to clarify a central distinction
between nudges and boosts by differentiating each policy type on the
basis of the mechanism through which each is supposed to affect behaviour.
Mechanistic knowledge is often useful for extrapolating evidence of
effectiveness, that is, for making reliable inferences about whether the
behavioural intervention will be effective in a different context or in the
long run (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff 2016). Second, based on these mechanistic
differences, it aims to develop a framework that can inform the choice
between these two types of behavioural policy in the run-up to empirical
test and implementation.
We will proceed as follows: Section 2 reviews existing definitions of
nudges and boosts. Section 3 proposes two mechanistic models that refine
existing distinctions and illustrates each model with two sets of cases.
Section 4 analyses the two mechanistic models to derive the contextual
1 Including the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK (ps://www.gov.uk/government/
organisations/behavioural-insights-team), and the Executive Order Using Behavioral
Science Insights to Better Serve the American People, signed by president Obama on 15
September 2015 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-
order-using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-american). More generally, the recent
OECD report surveys 159 uses of such policies from 23 member states (OECD 2017).
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conditions that each type of policy has to satisfy in order to be effective.
Section 5 concludes.
2. DEFINITIONS
Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016) have recently proposed a distinction
between two types of behavioural policies, which they associate with
two theoretical positions in the behavioural sciences – nudges with the
Heuristics and Biases program (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Kahneman
and Tversky 1996) and boosts with the Fast & Frugal Heuristics program
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Nudges and boosts are similar in that they seek to change behaviour
without substantially changing material incentives and without coercing
the agent through legal prohibitions or mandates. Furthermore, they both
assume that people use a limited set of heuristics to make decisions
and that the success or failure of these heuristics depends on properties
of the decision environment (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Grüne-Yanoff
and Hertwig 2016). By contrast, nudges and boosts differ both in their
ethical implications and in how they are hypothesized to affect behaviour.
In this paper, we bracket issues pertaining to the ethical assessment
of the policies. Instead, we focus on mechanistic differences between
the two policy types and derive the conditions under which each is
effective in relation to a specified policy goal such as increasing gym
attendance or saving rates. We also abstract from considerations of the
political economy of behavioural public policy by assuming that the
policymaker is a ‘benevolent planner’ (e.g. Schubert 2017). This is not
because we think ethical or political considerations are unimportant
or uninteresting. Bracketing them out, however, is instrumental to our
purpose of distinguishing the two types of policy solely on the basis of
the mechanisms through which they are supposed to operate.
In their Nudge book, Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 6) define nudges as:
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must
be easy and cheap to avoid.
Within the domain of non-incentivizing and non-coercive behavioural
policies, this definition is very inclusive. The only substantial constraint
it imposes is that nudges affect behaviour by intervening on the choice
architecture – that is, the properties of the environment in which the choice
is made. Thaler and Sunstein specify the above definition further by
arguing that nudges operate by instrumentalizing the effect of a biasing
heuristic. Status quo bias is an example of such a biasing heuristic
for them: it leads to systematically predictable inferior decisions. Thus,
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status quo bias has a powerful influence on people’s behaviour, and
‘that power can be harnessed’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 8). Starting
from the assumption that people use a limited set of heuristics to make
decisions (an assumption that it shares with the boost approach), the
nudge approach instrumentalizes these cognitive limitations to influence
behaviour. This harnessing strategy is one of the core ideas of the nudge
approach.
By contrast, boosts have been characterized by their ‘goal of
expanding (boosting) the decision maker’s set of competences and thus
helping them to reach their objectives’ (Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2016:
156). According to this definition, boosts are distinct from nudges in
at least two ways. First, boosts seek to realize this goal by expanding
agents’ set of competences; they aim to overcome human cognitive
limitations rather than instrumentalizing or harnessing them. Second,
boost interventions do not exclusively target the choice environment, but
often target the agents’ heuristic repertoire directly.
Therefore, the contrast between nudges and boosts that is relevant to
the goal of evaluating their effectiveness is as follows: a nudge intervenes
on people’s choice environment and harnesses a certain heuristic to
bring about a specific behavioural change; a boost intervenes on people’s
heuristic repertoires and expands that repertoire to bring about a specific
behavioural change.
We acknowledge this way of drawing the distinction does not fit all
available definitions. For example, some authors think that all behavioural
policies are nudges (Sunstein 2016). The situation is further complicated
by a lack of a widely accepted definition of nudges: different authors
have proposed varying characterizations (e.g. Bovens 2009; Hausman and
Welch 2010; Rebonato 2012; Heilmann 2014; Hansen 2016; Mongin and
Cozic 2017). Given that boosts have been defined in contrast to nudges,
these ambiguities might also affect the boost concept.
Our paper improves the understanding of the distinction between
these two types of behavioural policies.2 In particular, it expands on
and further clarifies the conceptual distinction proposed in Grüne-Yanoff
and Hertwig (2016) and Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017) by explicitly
modelling the underlying mechanisms of the respective policy types. In
fact, although Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016: 163) acknowledge the
importance of mechanisms, they do not perform a mechanistic analysis
of nudges and boosts and largely focus on the coherence between policy
approaches and the theories of bounded rationality that motivate them.
Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017: 17–19) discuss the distinct ‘causal
2 The purpose of our analysis is to capture the core distinction between these policy types.
Therefore, our definitions do not aim to replicate the preferred list of policy interventions
of any specific author.
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pathways’ through which these policies affect behaviour, but draw on the
psychological notion of a ‘cognitive architecture’ to explain this difference.
Furthermore, neither of the above papers analyses the implications
that a mechanism-based distinction has for ex-ante judgements of the
applicability and effectiveness of the two types of policy.
3. DISTINGUISHING BOOSTS AND NUDGES BY MECHANISMS
The effectiveness of a policy can be assessed empirically, for example
by performing randomized controlled experiments. The celebrated
Behavioural Insight Team has adopted this approach for assessing the
effectiveness of behavioural interventions. It has become increasingly
clear, however, that knowledge of the mechanism whereby a policy
operates greatly helps in planning and designing the right empirical trials,
in correctly interpreting their results, and most crucially, in exporting a
policy to other populations and settings (Cartwright 2010; Ludwig et al.
2011; Sampson et al. 2013; Clarke et al. 2014; Grüne-Yanoff 2016). Two
different policies aiming to achieve the same goal might exhibit similar
effect sizes in trials, but might operate through different mechanisms
that require different contextual conditions for their successful operation.
Disregarding this mechanistic information might lead to the wrong
conclusion that both policies are equally applicable in different contexts.
Current philosophy of science characterizes mechanisms broadly as
systems of causally interacting parts and processes, which – under certain
conditions – predictably produce one or more effects (e.g. Craver and
Tabery 2016; Glennan 2016; Marchionni 2017). In the case at hand, the
relevant mechanisms link policy interventions to agents’ behaviour. The
link between these components is mediated by the agents’ decisions
and the environment in which these decisions are taken. In particular,
the interventions with which we are concerned here are mediated by
decisions that are assumed to result from the use of a limited set of
heuristics. The behavioural effect of these heuristics in turn depends
on properties of the decision environment. Therefore, the relevant
components of the mechanisms are (i) the heuristic repertoire R, which
refers to the set of heuristics individuals have at their disposal, (ii) the
environment E and (iii) the resulting behaviour B. Clearly these components
are but a narrow selection of the context of intended application of a
behavioural intervention, which also includes political, institutional and
other sociocultural features. These simple representations nevertheless
allow us (i) to draw a clear-cut distinction between boosts and nudges and
(ii) to provide a systematic analysis of policy effectiveness across contexts,
that is, particular instantiations of the environment, heuristic repertoire
and behaviour. If at a later point, further details are considered relevant
for the analysis, these simple representations can be easily expanded.
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The main distinction we posit here relates to the way in which a choice
environment E is connected to the application of a particular heuristic in
repertoire R. According to the Heuristics & Biases literature, which guides
our analysis of the nudge mechanism, heuristics tend to be stable: type
of environment E always triggers the same heuristics and hence leads
to predictable behaviour. The older Heuristics & Biases literature often
considers heuristics to be cognitive illusions and sees them as analogous
to visual illusions (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Kahneman and Tversky
1996), which cannot be adjusted (e.g. in the Müller–Lyer illusion, we
‘see’ that one line is longer than another, even if we know that this
impression is false). Similarly, the more recent literature often considers
the heuristics responsible for behavioural deficits to be located in System
1, which ‘operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort, and
no sense of voluntary control’ (Kahneman 2011: 20). In particular, this
‘System 1’ is believed to be ‘not readily educable’ (Kahneman 2011: 417),
which implies that it is hard to change with interventions. Irrespective
of what the underlying conceptual models are, most Heuristics & Biases
proponents seem convinced that ‘our ability to de-bias people is quite
limited’ (Thaler cited in Bond 2009). Based on the view that heuristics are
stable, changing the environment E appears as a promising avenue toward
predictable behavioural change. Consequently, in the nudge mechanism,
the intervention aims at influencing behaviour B by modifying the agents’
choice environment E.
By contrast, according to the Fast & Frugal Heuristics literature, which
guides our analysis of the boost mechanism, the choice of heuristics from
repertoire R is to some extent controlled by the agent. This requires the
agent to be equipped with various competences, including those needed
to identify the problem at hand and the goals pursued, as well as to select
the heuristic from the repertoire that (is believed to) further the goal.
Hence, training the agent in new decision tools can be used to change
her behaviour, even when the environment E does not change. Although
the adaptive use of one’s heuristic repertoire might not be universal, the
Fast & Frugal Heuristics program contends that:
An automatic rule is adapted to our past environment without a present
evaluation as to whether it is appropriate. It is simply triggered when the
stimulus is present . . . . The flexible rules, in contrast, involve a quick
evaluation of which one to use . . . . Gut-feelings may appear simplistic, but
their underlying intelligence lies in selecting the right rule of thumb for the
right situation. (Gigerenzer 2007: 49)
The literature contains ample examples of behavioural domains in which
agents predictably switched from automatic to flexible decision rules
(Pachur and Hertwig 2006; Volz et al. 2006; Mega et al. 2015). Take, for
example, the recognition heuristic, which suggests choosing the option one
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recognizes over less familiar or unknown options to identify the largest
among a number of cities. Clearly, such a heuristic is successful only
in environments in which recognition differentiates between alternatives
and is associated with the relevant selection criterion. Researchers found
that agents are sensitive to this association when applying the heuristic:
people appear to frequently overrule recognition information in an
environment in which there is little to no relationship between recognition
and the criterion. Indeed, we found that in such an environment, the use of
the recognition heuristic was restrained. (Pachur and Hertwig 2006: 993)
In the boost mechanism, the assumed relation between environment E
and heuristic repertoire R is thus different from the nudge mechanism.
Instead of triggering a particular heuristic, the environment provides
informational cues, which inform the agent’s selection of a heuristic. For
instance, if cues in the environment do not match the recognition heuristic
(e.g. there is no relationship between recognition and the criterion), then
another heuristic is chosen. Because here heuristics are selected by the
agents rather than triggered, it is possible to bring about changes in
behaviour B by way of training agents on how and when to use novel
heuristics. This is why we characterize boosts as intervening on the agents’
heuristic repertoire R rather than on the environment.
On the basis of these considerations, we derive two stylized
mechanistic models of nudges and boosts (Figure 1).3 In both models,
behaviour B is caused by the application of heuristic h from repertoire
R in environment E.
Let the heuristic function h represents the causal influence of R and E
on B and the subscripts n and b represent the boost and the nudge model,
respectively. In nudges, heuristics are assumed to be stable so that changes
in environment E lead to predictable changes in behaviour B:
Bn = hn (E)
To capitalize on this relationship, nudge interventions target and
modify the environment, as indicated by the red arrow on the left of
Figure 1.
By contrast, in the boost mechanism, the chooser selects heuristics
adaptively depending on their fit with a given environment, so that
Bb = hB (R, E)
3 We use the term model to highlight the fact that they are simplified representations that
leave out many features of what a realistic description of the mechanisms behind heuristic
decision-making would presumably entail. Many of these features however are likely to
be common to both the nudge and the boost mechanism. Our purpose here is to focus
attention on their differences.
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FIGURE 1. Mechanisms of nudge and boost interventions (Colour online)
Given that the behavioural outcome B is mediated by the agent’s
selection of heuristics from R, boost interventions target the heuristic
repertoire R as indicated by the red arrow on the right of Figure 1.
Consequently, the models distinguish nudges and boosts in two ways:
by the mechanisms they assume to be at work to produce behaviour
(i.e. heuristics as stable or flexible factors) and, more importantly for our
purposes, by the component of the mechanism the intervention targets
(i.e. environment E or heuristic repertoire R).
Note that here we do not ask: ‘Which model is generally true?’ but
rather: ‘Which intervention is effective in which context?’ (see also Chetty
2015). In practice, this means keeping open the possibility that the two
models are not competing representations of heuristic-based decision-
making, but apply to different kinds of heuristics (Chow 2015; Polonioli
2016). Finding out whether a heuristic-produced behaviour can be more
effectively intervened upon through a nudge or a boost is ultimately an
empirical question – but asking and evaluating this question requires
an understanding of the conceptual distinction and of its underlying
mechanisms.
To illustrate the difference between the nudge and the boost
mechanisms in more concrete terms, we now consider examples of
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behavioural interventions that aim at producing the same outcome but
do so in different ways.
3.1. Financial behaviour
Policymakers and experts in the financial domain have been concerned
that many people lack sufficient financial literacy to successfully plan
lifetime consumption or run a small business. Different behavioural
interventions have been proposed with the goal of improving financial
behaviour.
Save More Tomorrow (SMT) is a behavioural intervention designed
to increase people’s retirement savings. Its design is based on viewing
decisions about retirement savings as trade-offs between current and later
(retirement-age) consumption and aims to influence these decisions by
changing one of the options in the trade-off (Thaler and Benartzi 2004;
Benartzi and Thaler 2013). That is, instead of asking people to choose a
trade-off between consumption now or later, the policymakers ask people
to choose a trade-off between consumption in the near future (say, a
year from now) and later. The rationale behind this intervention is that
people tend to systematically overvalue the immediate present over the
future, thus reducing willingness to save for retirement now. The theory of
hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) captures this finding
but also suggests that modifying the timing of options may be used to
reduce this effect. The SMT program also takes into account people’s
inertia (increases in savings are automatic) to ease them into self-control
restrictions (by projecting them into the future). Various observational
studies show that this intervention is effective. Among people who said
that they could not afford a cut in pay now, 78% joined the programme
(see Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
An alternative policy targeting financial behaviour trains people in
the use of simple rules of thumb (SRT) for making financial decisions
(Drexler et al. 2014). For example, people were trained to keep their money
in two separate drawers (or purses) for their business and household,
respectively, and to transfer money from one drawer to the other only
when accompanied by an explicit ‘I Owe You’ note. This simple rule of
thumb for structuring revenues had significant and substantial effects on
business practices, reporting errors and revenues, in particular in low-
skilled individuals (Drexler et al. 2014). Notably, training a control group
in standard accounting practices did not have comparable effects.
Both SMT and SRT have been shown to be effective interventions
to facilitate far-sighted financial behaviour. And although they pursue
closely related goals, they do so through different pathways. SMT
intervenes on a feature of the environment – the temporal location
of the saving choice. By shifting it into the future, SMT seeks to
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harness the relatively low discounting rates between two events that are
located at a sufficient distance in the future, as implied by hyperbolic
discounting. SMT expects that the change, under the hyperbolically
discounting heuristic, will cause an increase in saving choice. It thus
uses knowledge about a feature of people’s heuristic repertoire to
change the choice environment such that people are likely to adjust
their behaviour accordingly. According to our distinction, SMT is
a nudge.
SRT, in contrast, is a boost because it intervenes in people’s heuristic
repertoire by teaching them a new rule of thumb. The rule helps
choosers to interpret the environment in new ways (according to
the household/business account distinction), and will only be applied
if matching information cues (i.e. separate sources of income and
expenditure that match this distinction) can be found in the environment.
To the extent that the training is successful, it expands the agents’ heuristic
repertoire so that they exhibit better business discipline and are more
likely to succeed in their businesses.
3.2. Gym attendance
Policymakers and experts in the health domain have been concerned that
many people do too little exercise and therefore are more likely to suffer
from cardiovascular and other diseases. Again, different behavioural
interventions have been proposed with the goal of increasing gym
attendance.
Providing gym membership by default is such a policy. Typically,
gym memberships are ‘opt-in’, since an employee might get a subsidy
for membership but must choose to become a member to use this
subsidy. The default-setting (DS) policy changes this to an ‘opt-out’: you are
automatically enrolled, but if you explicitly choose not to be a member,
you might use the subsidy for other services. The effectiveness of such
policies has been shown in domains like saving for retirement (Beshears
et al. 2009) but it has also been applied with the goal of increasing
the exercise regime. For example, as part of a broad regime of health-
improving measures, the Cleveland Clinic has implemented such an opt-
out system and reports substantial weight loss and reduction in blood
pressure amongst its employees (Klein 2011).
Alternatively, Temptation Bundling (TB) teaches people a strategy to
overcome self-control problems by coupling ‘instantly gratifying “want”
activities (e.g., watching the next episode of a television show, checking
Facebook, eating an indulgent meal) with engagement in a “should”
behaviour that provides long-term benefits but requires the exertion of
willpower (e.g., working out, completing a paper review)’ (Milkman
et al. 2013: 1–2). Specifically, the experimenters recommended that the
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subjects allow themselves to enjoy a number of desirable audio novels
only while exercising, thus making their gym attendance more tempting.
In comparison to a control group that was just given a bookstore
voucher of the same value as the audiobooks (0.94 gym visits/week),
the subjects using TB showed a higher weekly gym attendance rate (1.42
visits/week).
Both TB and DS aim at increasing gym attendance rates. As in the
previous case, the two interventions do so through distinct pathways. TB
aims to enrich the agents’ heuristic repertoire by training them in the use
of a new heuristic. This heuristic helps them interpret their environment
in a novel way (‘Am I facing a self-control problem with respect to the
gym or not?’). If the chooser detects a positive cue in this dimension, she
reacts by applying the bundling rule. This in turn affects her behaviour,
making her visit the gym more often. Thus, according to our model, TB is
a boost.
DS in contrast intervenes in the environment by changing the
default setting of a choice situation. Many experiments have shown
that people tend to choose the default option more often, be this for
reasons of inertia, loss aversion or recommendation effects (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008; Beshears et al. 2009). DS uses knowledge about these
tendencies to change the environment in such a way that people are
likely to choose the desired option. According to our model, DS is
a nudge.
4. MODEL ANALYSIS: CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF NUDGES AND BOOSTS
So far, we have described how nudges and boosts affect the three
components of our model: environment E, heuristic repertoire R and
behaviour B in a given context. For each component, we now derive
the conditions that must be satisfied for nudges and boosts to change
behaviour via the posited mechanisms.
For the analysis, we think of boost and nudge interventions as two-
stage processes. In Figure 1, these stages are separated by the dashed blue
line. In the intervention stage, people’s judgement and decision-making
is affected by the policy. In the implementation stage, the judgement and
decision is implemented into actual behaviour.
Concerning the conditions that must be satisfied, let us briefly
consider our examples from Sections 3.1 and 3.2. At the intervention
stage, the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) and Default Setting (DS) nudges
intervene in the choice environment by altering the trade-off between
future prospects and by resetting the default, respectively. The assumption
is that, despite these changes, the intervention will trigger the same
heuristic – hyperbolic discounting and the tendency to accept the default
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– as before. If the assumption of stable heuristics were not met, the
effectiveness of these nudge interventions would be jeopardized. Thus,
trigger stability is a necessary condition for nudges.
At the intervention stage, the Simple Rules of Thumb (SRT) and
Temptation Bundling (TB) boosts intervene in the agent’s cognitive
setup by training her to use new rules for structuring and processing
information in the environment. Although SRT or TB need not necessarily
involve a reflective judgement of what the rational decision is – for TB
it is enough to train the agent to structure the environment in a way
that is conducive to a better use of her temptations and impulses – the
success of a boost crucially depends on successfully teaching/learning
the new heuristics. Thus, failures of boost interventions include a lack
of motivation or skill on the part of the agent or pedagogical failures
for difficult-to-teach heuristics. Thus, the agents’ motivation and the
teachability of heuristics are necessary conditions for effective boosts at the
intervention stage.
At the implementation stage, agents in a population may differ with
respect to their level of competence and/or the heuristics they have
at their disposal. This poses a problem for nudges, because nudges
aim to change behaviour by harnessing people’s heuristics, and such a
harnessing must focus on the dominant heuristic in the population. A
wide variety of employed heuristics in the population diminishes the
effectiveness of nudges’ one-size-fits-all solution and therefore requires a
high degree of homogeneity in people’s heuristic repertoires to yield reliable
results. Boosts, in contrast, aim to enrich people’s set of heuristics,
and therefore remain untroubled by a high degree of heterogeneity in
people’s heuristic repertoires. A similar problem for nudges results from
adaptations to an intervention, that is, when agents compensate for its
behavioural effects or get used to it when it is applied repeatedly over
time. Such temporal effects may interfere with the intended behavioural
change.
For boosts, knowledge of selection criteria – when and when not
to apply a heuristic – is a prerequisite at the implementation stage.
Furthermore, stable selection patterns are threatened in situations where
people do not have adequate resources to apply a taught heuristic, or
where the heuristic contradicts prevailing values. We summarize these
conditions in Table 1 (where a  indicates that a specific condition is
required and a – that it is not) and then proceed to elaborate on each
condition in turn.
4.1. Trigger stability
The Heuristics & Biases programme has documented many persistent
cognitive biases, mainly through laboratory experiments (Tversky and
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Conditions Nudges Boosts
Intervention Stage
Trigger stability  −
Agent motivation − 
Teachability of heuristics − 
Implementation Stage
Homogeneity of heuristic repertoire  −
Temporal effects  −
Selection criteria − 
Individual/Environmental resources − 
TABLE 1. Summary of conditions and impact on the
effectiveness of nudges and boosts.
Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Haselton et al. 2005). However,
even if the existence of a bias is established, it is an additional question
whether it will be stable when a nudge is implemented.
Let’s consider the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) intervention discussed
in Section 3.1. This nudge works if people show stable preferences related
to hyperbolic discounting, that is, overvaluation of benefits obtained in
the present over similar or even higher benefits available in the future.
However, if the agent were aware that what matters for the decision is
her view in a year’s time she might adjust her evaluation and apply
a different heuristic. In such cases, changing the timing of the options
will not result in the predicted behavioural reaction. Similarly, if the
agent interpreted the intervention as an attempt to manipulate her, she
might seek to avoid the manipulation by changing her reactions (for
evidence of these kinds of reactance, cf. Brehm and Brehm 1981; Campbell
2007). Similar complications might arise with respect to the example of
Default Setting (DS). For example, ‘in contexts that involve less effort, and
clearer antecedent preferences, default rules are less likely to stick, and
disclosures might make them less sticky still’ (Sunstein 2016: 118). Also,
if existing defaults are greater attractors than other options, because they
are more salient, carry a signal better, or because they are less offensive,
reactance to changes in default might result (Grüne-Yanoff 2016). In other
words, when switching defaults as a policy intervention, one is not
guaranteed that the same number of people will stick with the new default
as they did with the old.
The goal of a nudge is to change the environment in such a way
that the application of a given heuristic, which is assumed to be stable
across environments, leads to a defined behavioural outcome. Hence,
what needs to be established is that the triggering relationship between
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the environment and a heuristic is stable. If the relationship is unstable,
policymakers cannot hope to reliably change behaviour by altering the
environment. In other words, nudge interventions require trigger stability
between planned changes in the environment and known heuristics. By contrast,
since in our model of boosts heuristics are selected by the agent rather
than triggered, the stability between the environmental trigger and the
behaviour is not required for a boost to work. As we will see, boosts
require a different sort of stability, namely sufficient (environmental)
resources so that the agent is able to select the right heuristic from the
heuristic repertoire.
4.2. Agent motivation
By definition, boosts aim at changing the agent’s heuristic repertoire and
therefore require the agent’s active participation at the intervention stage.
If the agent is either not able or not motivated to participate, it is unlikely
(though not impossible) that a boost changes behaviour (see also Grüne-
Yanoff and Hertwig 2016). Because ability is something to which a boost
can in principle be calibrated but motivation is not, we examine each
condition separately. We focus on motivation in this subsection and turn
to teachability in the next.
Even the most inquisitive student will be bored or distracted by
disorganized teaching. Thus, motivation clearly has a component that
can be addressed by good pedagogical design. Motivation to learn and
practice is, of course, a large topic that cannot be comprehensively
discussed here. However, we indicate some conditions that might affect
an agent’s motivation. First, an agent’s motivation depends on having a
goal that she wants to achieve such as better health, financial stability or
improved self-control. If she does not conceive of the intervention as a
relevant means for her goal, a boost is less likely to be effective because she
will see no reason to learn or undergo training in the first place. Second,
even if an agent sees an intervention as a means to achieve her goals, she
might not see the need to learn new heuristics because she believes in her
current strategy and does not see the added benefit of an alternative one.
Third, even if people are motivated to adjust their current strategy, they
may not be motivated to learn unless they are convinced that the boost
provides them with effective means to achieve their goals (e.g. thousands
of purported ‘dietary rules’ are peddled – often by agents with less than
sincere motives – and the success of most of these rules is very uncertain
at best). In other words, if the level of expected effort appears higher than
the expected benefit from learning, people will not be motivated to learn.
Thus, in case agents do not see the added benefit of learning
new strategies to achieve their goals, boosts tend to be less effective
than nudges. Of course, motivation to learn may be increased by
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appropriate information about the pros, cons and effectiveness of the
boost before training. Sometimes, lack of motivation may even be
addressed with specific boosts (or nudges). Nevertheless, even the
best training interventions and preparatory information might fail to
motivate people, for example, because they suffer from inertia or keep
procrastinating. In sum, in contexts where motivation is lacking, nudges tend
to be more effective than boosts because a change in the environment does not
require the agents’ active participation.
4.3. Teachability of heuristics
Motivated agents might fail to learn a heuristic because of pedagogical
failures. Such failures might lie either in the design of the heuristic itself
or in the way it is taught. For example, most people will be challenged
to learn how to extract power roots without paper and pencil. Tools that
require more memory and processing capacity than a person can muster
are examples of such design failures. Less extreme examples include
the difficulty of teaching low-skilled individuals standard accounting
practices. As Drexler et al. (2014) showed, training small-business owners
in standard accounting practices had no effect in improving reporting
practices and business success, while simple rules of thumb training had
a significant effect.
The Fast & Frugal Heuristics programme has provided evidence that
simple, easy-to-grasp rules can be used to make sufficiently accurate
judgements compared to more complicated procedures (Gigerenzer et al.
1999). The benefits of such decision-making strategies have been observed
in a variety of settings, ranging from food consumption, to the stock
market to online dating (van der Linden 2011). Thus, boosts are most
effective in domains where simple and effective rules of thumbs can be
identified or simple ways exist to teach a more complicated strategy.
Hence, when teachability is low, nudges tend to be the better choice.
The second issue concerns good pedagogy. Here again, the relevant
literature is extensive. We want to mention only one contextual factor
that strikes us as important. As we have defined them, boosts aim to
teach the right application of simple heuristics, which must be trained
in repeated applications in order to be learned. An important feature
of training success is sufficient and prompt feedback. In most training
situations (such as schools, universities or PhD supervision), feedback is
provided by the teacher. Since boosts are intended for large populations,
not for individual training sessions, the feedback should be provided
automatically. In fact, many successful boosts include such feedbacks. For
example, people trying out Temptation Bundling (TD) might see their
exercise time go up, or at least find it easier to regularly visit the gym.
Similarly, people who have taken a first lesson in simple rules of thumb
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for running small businesses might see that applying the rules positively
affects their business behaviour.
We do not believe that feedback is a necessary condition for the
effectiveness of boosts in the strict sense, however. In the short run,
Simple Rules of Thumb (SRT) may be effective even without the user
being aware of its function. But without positive feedback, people have
no reason to continue using a heuristic in the longer run. For example,
it is plausible to assume that people would eventually discontinue using
separate drawers for family and business accounts, unless they came to
understand that this helps them achieve better financial discipline and
ultimately better business outcomes. Also, feedback is not a sufficient
condition for learning. For example, outcome feedback does not make
people’s tendency to underestimate rare events go away (Hertwig et al.
2004). However, there is evidence that feedback helps people learn to use
their heuristics adaptively (Rieskamp and Otto 2006). In general, feedback
will help to create confidence in the effectiveness of a boost, which in turn will
increase the likelihood that people persist and maintain motivation to learn and
apply it.
The previous three conditions concern requirements for effective
boosts and nudges at the intervention stage. When the corresponding
conditions are satisfied, nudges will trigger heuristics systematically and
reliably and boosts will successfully enrich people’s heuristic repertoire.
However, this does not ensure that either intervention will change
behaviour in the intended direction. For this to happen the heuristic
triggered or the newly learned heuristic must reliably affect the behaviour
of at least the majority of the targeted population in a particular direction.
That is, there should be some positive net effect: for example, that more
people show the behaviour than before, or – when there is a quantifiable
behavioural outcome, like a retirement contribution – that the average
outcome has changed in the desired direction. This leads to the discussion
of the implementation stage of Figure 1, where heuristics or behavioural
tendencies produce actual behaviour.
4.4. Homogeneity of heuristic repertoire across individuals
We start by analysing the conditions for the effectiveness of nudges at the
implementation stage. Nudges typically affect the choice environment for
a whole population based on the so-called equal incompetence assumption,
which ‘treats all . . . actors in all situations as if they were equally
predisposed to commit errors of judgment and choice’ (Mitchell 2002: 2).
Thus, the behavioural triggers that nudges exploit do not, and
typically cannot, discriminate between individuals who may have
different heuristics at their disposal or simply differ in their levels
of competency. Let us illustrate the problem of heterogeneity with an
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example from the Default Setting (DS) intervention. Beshears et al. (2009)
describe the effects of resetting the default of the retirement saving rate.
Employees hired before a set date were offered a choice with a default
rate of 3%, while employees hired after that were offered the same choice
with a default rate of 6%. The intended effect was an increase of those
who chose the 6% contribution (from 24% to 49%) and a decrease of
those selecting the 3% contribution (from 28% to 4%). It is tempting
to consider this as evidence of the effectiveness of the default resetting
in this particular context. However, such an interpretation neglects the
effects the default resetting had at the individual level on other, non-
default contribution rates. In particular, an analysis at the individual level
showed that it reduced the frequency of higher contribution rates (the
proportion of those selecting contribution rates over 7% fell from 41% to
30%) and increased the frequency of low contribution rates (the number
of those selecting less than 3% increased from 5% to 15%). These effects
are substantial: a revisit of the data shows that the mean contribution
rate is actually lowered by the default resetting (from 6.88% to 6.31%).
Consequently, the resetting did not just shift some people from a 3% to a
6% contribution rate. It also affected people with other contribution rates,
so that (i) about the same number of people chose the new default and
(ii) more people chose a lower contribution, yielding a mean reduction
in contributions. Contrary to first impressions, the nudge produced a
worse result because of the heterogeneity in the population. One can easily
imagine similarly unwanted effects of the Save More Tomorrow (SMT)
nudge if the heterogeneity of the underlying discounted evaluation is too
large. In such a context, SMT would make some people save less, while
other people would save more, without obtaining an optimum for anyone.
Some proponents of nudge policies do consider the possibility of such
heterogeneity. Asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003), for example,
assumes that some members of a population may be fully rational, and
hence not in need of a nudge that others require. Asymmetric paternalism
refers to an intervention that ‘creates large benefits to those who make
errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational’
(Camerer et al. 2003: 1212). Consequently, it seeks to devise policies that
affect only those ‘in need’ of a nudge. Asymmetric nudges are designed
so that those whose behaviour is considered optimal or more than optimal
remain unaffected and continue to implement their behaviour, even if
deviant from the suggested option. Although a considerable improvement
over the equal incompetence assumption, which runs into problems such
as those described above, even asymmetric paternalism assumes that
those who are subject to the bias are uniformly affected so that the same
nudge can steer them toward more optimal choices. Thus, the conclusion
remains that to be effective, nudge interventions require sufficient homogeneity
in the population’s heuristic repertoire.
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4.5. Temporal effects
Nudges are designed to trigger the deployment of an existing heuristic to
generate a certain behaviour, without trying to convince and sometimes
without explicitly informing the agent about the goal of the intervention.
That, of course, is the point of nudging: rather than convincing the agent
that it would be in her best interest to save more or exercise more now,
the nudge circumvents this difficult task by exploiting known tendencies
or heuristics that reliably predict behaviours given certain environmental
stimuli. The problem with this approach is that because the agent is
not actively participating, she might engage in additional behaviour that
counteracts or compensates the desired behavioural change.
Imagine, for example, a company policy that aims at making people
exercise more, and thus subscribes all employees for 10 monthly gym
visits by default. Assume that the policy makes a difference: once it is
implemented, people spend more time in the company gym than before.
However, spending more time in the gym is not the ultimate goal of the
policy: making people exercise more is. It is possible that some people go
more often to the company gym, but keep track of their overall exercise
time and cut back proportionally on their previous exercise time outside
the company gym. Whereas adaptation to boosts implies that a new and
effective heuristic is learned and can be applied successfully, adaptations
to a nudge are less predictable because the nudged are not consciously
aware of the intervention and might be pursuing a different goal than
the one intended by the policymaker. While the repeated and successful
application of a heuristic acquired via a boost is likely to increase the
agent’s competence, the effect of a nudge might not persist over time
because the repeated implementation adversely affects the stability of the
triggering relationship between environmental stimuli and the agent’s
heuristics. Thus, before designing and implementing a nudge, potential temporal
effects, that is, reactions to a nudge over time, must be carefully analysed.
Of course, over time the wearing-off effect might be counteracted
by learning effects. For example, a study of energy conservation nudges
shows that the effects of a one-time intervention wear off quickly.
However, repeated exposure may ‘gradually change [people’s] capital
stock of habits or physical technologies’ so that ‘after two years, . . . effects
decay at only 10 to 20 percent per year’ (Allcott and Rogers 2014: 3034). In
this case, we suspect that a repeated nudge may come close to a boost in
that it ends up slowly changing people’s repertoire of strategies and/or
resources for action.
Similar evidence concerning the malleability of people’s heuristic
strategies comes from research into default setting, which shows that
after receiving a good default, people are more likely to accept defaults
in the future, even if doing so results in worse outcomes than going
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against the default (de Haan and Linde 2016). The reverse effect is also
possible, however. Let’s consider the gym-exercise example again. One
likely effect of increased gym attendance is that with time, employees will
build preferences. That is, they will discover whether they like going to
the gym and whether they feel the perceived benefit is worth their while.
For people with clear-cut preferences, ‘default rules are less likely to stick’
(Sunstein 2016: 118). In that case, an initial increase in gym attendance due
to the default might be followed by a drop-off, as only those who actually
like going to the gym will stick with it.
Both types of effects – immediate compensations for nudges and
changes in habits or preferences over time – might impact the effectiveness
of nudge policies, as they modify the desired behaviour in hard-to-predict
ways. More specifically, the very intervention that caused the behavioural
change in the first place may cause its increase or degradation due
to adaptations over time. Although such effects cannot be completely
precluded for boosts, they are less likely to occur because the application
of a newly learned cognitive heuristic is goal-directed by definition.4 If, for
instance, people apply Temptation Bundling (TB), they do so because they
aim to increase their exercise regime. Consequently, they have little reason
to compensate for more gym visits afterwards, unless they deliberately
decide to do so. Nor should one expect the effect to wear off, because
more use of the heuristic means more training in its application, and, as
with most training, a more effective application as a consequence.
4.6. Selection criteria
To be effective, boosts require not only that agents learn a new heuristic,
but also that they are able to recognize when to apply it under at least
some range of variation in environmental conditions. More precisely,
in order for a boost to reliably change behaviour in the long run, two
conditions must be satisfied. The first is that the agents should be able
to recognize the conditions for the effective selection of the new heuristic.
The second is that the agents should continue to select the newly learned
heuristic rather than fall back on previous heuristics. We focus on the
former condition here and turn to the latter in the next subsection.
Boosts, such as Simple Rules of Thumb (SRT) and Temptation
Bundling (TB), increase people’s competence to flexibly apply heuristics
in specific environments. As such, a heuristic ‘may appear simplistic, but
their underlying intelligence lies in selecting the right rule of thumb for
the right situation’ (Gigerenzer 2007: 49). To solve this so-called strategy
4 The possibility that agents might use the heuristic in unexpected ways, which may
undermine the effect that the newly taught heuristic was designed to achieve cannot be
excluded a priori. It is however a far-fetched possibility. We thank an anonymous referee
for pointing this out.
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selection problem, people must be sensitive to their applicability criteria,
which are hidden in the structure of cues in the choice environment. Take,
for instance, the recognition heuristic. If you recognize the name of one
city, football club or stock on a list but not the others, then this option
is likely to rank highest in value and choosing it will likely be successful.
However, the recognition heuristic breaks down if you recognize more
than one option or if the reason why you recognized a particular option
is no longer valid (e.g. the population size of Detroit decreased after the
crisis of the automobile industry; the competitiveness of a football club
decreased because its best players left, etc.).
Similarly, a simple lexicographic decision rule examines cues in a
ranked order one at a time and makes a binary decision based on the
first cue that discriminates between two options. Such a simple rule has
been shown to perform at least as well as a linear decision algorithm
that integrates all informational cues, but only if the environment is such
that the predictive power of the highest-ranked cue indeed dominates all
others and cannot be outweighed by the remaining cues (S¸ims¸ek 2013).
Which cue structure is required for the effective application of a specific
rule is an empirical question. The Fast and Frugal literature has shown
that there are environments for which simple rules are a good match, but
not all environments have a cue structure that can be matched successfully
by some simple rule (e.g. Gigerenzer et al. 1999; S¸ims¸ek 2013). There might
be environments in which decisions can be satisfactorily made only with
computationally more intense strategies. In sum, when the effectiveness of a
boost depends on the cue structure of the environment, people should be taught
not only the heuristic but also the right selection rule.
4.7. Individual/environmental resources
What ensures that the agents will continue to select the newly learned
heuristic rather than fall back on previous heuristics? Even when the
agents are capable of recognizing the conditions for the application of the
new heuristic, this in itself does not ensure that they will continue to select
it. Other features of the decision environment, such as time, money, will
power or value incongruence, might get in the way, especially in the long
run. Consider for example the Temptation Bundling (TB) intervention. If
personally relevant temptations cannot be effectively matched in terms
of timing (e.g. I must go to the gym and want to go bungee jumping),
financial means (e.g. I have money only to go to the gym or to go
bungee jumping), or values (e.g. working out is healthy and eating cake
is pleasant), it might be hard to stick with the new behaviour in the long
run. In general, if resources such as time or money become scarce, it is
relatively easy to fall back on pre-existing habits and behaviours. Similar
problems occur if the new behaviours are not congruent with people’s
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value systems. Even if in the beginning the tension is resolved in favour
of the new behaviour, there is no guarantee that this will be maintained
in the long run. Thus, whereas nudges change environments to match people’s
heuristics by definition, when designing and implementing boostable heuristics,
environmental conditions such as the particular value system of the targeted
population and the (temporal and financial) resources available to them must be
well analysed before a boost can be reliably implemented.
5. CONCLUSION
We have distinguished boosts from nudges on the basis of the different
mechanisms through which they operate. Our simplified models of these
mechanisms consist of three main components: the environment, the
agent’s heuristic repertoire and her behaviour. In these models, nudges
and boosts mainly differ with respect to the point of intervention: whether
it is the environment (nudges) or the agent’s heuristic repertoire (boosts).
On the basis of these simplified models of the mechanisms, we have
identified the contextual conditions that must be satisfied for nudges and
boosts to be effectively applied.
In particular, we showed that, at the intervention stage, the
effectiveness of nudges is mainly influenced by how reliably the designed
changes in environmental stimuli trigger the intended behaviour (trigger
stability). At the implementation stage, effective nudge interventions must
consider the variance in strategies used across the targeted population
as well as differences in levels of competence (homogeneity of heuristic
repertoire). Similarly, we showed that the success of nudges is sensitive to
potential temporal effects, such as when people adapt to nudges over time.
For boosts, what mostly matters at the intervention stage are the agents’
motivation to learn and implement a boost as well as its teachability. We also
showed that for boosts to be implemented reliably, people must solve the
selection problem by knowing when to apply a heuristic and have adequate
resources to be able to apply it.
The success criteria we identified for boosts and nudges are not mutu-
ally exclusive. That is, there may be situations in which both interventions
are effective or neither of them is. However, we believe that the results
of our analysis can help to identify likely obstacles that a particular
context of application might pose for the working of either mechanism,
and hence serve as a planning tool for assessing and evaluating the likely
effectiveness of a behavioural policy in a given context.
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